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BAR BRIEFS

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Bank vs. Crandell: Amercement under Sec. 777 o , Bonding Fund
also a party. Plaintiff recovered judgment against K. It directed
sale of mortgaged premises. On sale net proceeds were $1,688.18,
leaving balance of $4,388.83 on judgment, for which execution issued.
Sheriff received execution Sept. 26, 1929, and his return is dated
Dec. 13, 1929, with notation of no property found, after search of

records showing no property in name of debtor but chattel mortgages
totaling $io,ooo against the debtor. The attorney for the debtors
advised holding of execution, pending some settlement with judgment
creditor. The sheriff discussed the prospects of settlement with
plaintiff's attorney, once before the expiration of the 6o-day period,
and once after. Conflicting evidence as to whether plaintiff's attorney
agreed to holding of execution. Trial judge's memorandum states:
"This record, coupled with the admission of the defendant that the
judgment debtor's attorney prevailed upon the sheriff not to levy the
execution in the first instance, leaves no doubt in the mind of the
Court that the plaintiff's attorney had nothing to do with the delay."
Lee vs. Dolan, 34 N. D. 449; Solberg vs. Rettinger, 40 N. D. i; Bank
vs. Wright, 54 N. D. 422, are cited. HELD: The failure of the sheriff
is not attributable to the plaintiff. Sheriff's physical inability to perform the duties of his office during part of the 6o-day period is of no
merit, as the sheriff was provided with a deputy. Contention of
Bonding Fund that Section 7775 does not apply, and that the Fund's
measure of damages should be actual damages, dismissed. "While
amercement is a harsh remedy and somewhat penal in character, there
is nevertheless a marked distinction between it and an award of
exemplary or punitive damages. . . The liability in any event is
predicated upon the failure of the principal to 'discharge and perform
the duties of his said office or employment including such duties as
are or may be imposed upon him by law'."
Newton vs. Gretter: Plaintiff, driving car with one light in a
road, drifted with snow, and having three wheel tracks or "ruts,"
saw another car, with one light, approaching at a high rate of speed.
The plaintiff turned out of the "ruts" to the shoulder of the road and
stopped. This left two "ruts" in which defendant could travel.
Defendant saw plaintiff's car when half a mile away, but failed to
get into the two right-hand "ruts," drove into plaintiff, demolishing
both cars. HELD: Quoting statute, "Whenever a motor vehicle is
parked or stopped upon a highway whether attended or unattended
during the time mentioned in Section 49 (Section 49 requires the
lighting of a motor vehicle during a period from a half hour after
sunset to a half hour before sunrise) there shall be displayed
upon such motor vehicle one or more lamps projecting a white light
visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five
hundred feet to the front of such motor vehicle. . . "-Sec. 55, Chap.
162, S. L. 1927. It can not be said there was contributory negligence
as a matter of law in this case, and the question was fairly put to the
jury. Medical testimony, based on actual physical examination, is
admissible, and he may give his opinion as to the permanent character
of the injuries to the plaintiff. The question was properly submitted
to the jury.

BAR BRIEFS

Strampher vs. Hupe: One H. and wife resided on land homesteaded by them. The land was deeded to their son, and there is
testimony that he paid over $2,ooo for it. The deed was recorded in
January, 1922. In October, i92i, plaintiff entered into agreement
with H. for leasing the land. The lease was subsequently broken,.
and plaintiff recovered judgment for such breach in 1927. He alleged
that the transfer was in fraud of creditors and asked to have the deed
set aside: HELD: (following many prior N. D. cases) Creditors can
not be defrauded, hindered or delayed by the transfer of homestead
property. A debtor can commit fraud on creditors only by disposing
of property to which the creditor has a legal right to look for satisfaction of his claim. As burden of proving fraudulent transfer was
on plaintiff the general denial was sufficient answer to the complaint.
SELECTING JUDGES
Does any practicing lawyer in North Dakota dare to make public
declaration that there is room for improvement in the caliber of our
North Dakota judges? Probably not. Does any practicing lawyer
dare to deny to himself that there is some room for improvement?
We doubt it. Does any practicing lawyer fail to appreciate that there
are known changes in the method of selecting judges which give some
promise of being equal to the task of bringing about such improvement? We voice an almost certain "No." What, then, do lawyers
fear, and why?
We've been wanting to ask this question for some time, but have
been waiting for moral support. It came recently in the form of a
severe indictment of New York City conditions by William N. Cohen,
former judge of the New York Supreme Court.
Judge Cohen is most outspoken in his demand for a change in
the method of selecting judges. He knows the evils that exist, points
them out plainly, and suggests a remedy. He mentions no names,
but stands ready to make designations, upon request. He says: "It is
not my purpose to be personal in this article, to injure any individual
judge nor to be partisan at any coming election; but to indict the
system and point out its defects so that the public may become aware
of the gravity of the situation." That is a commendable attitude, and
should be the line of approach everywhere.
Regarding the Bar's relation to the matter Judge Cohen says:
"Why, then, it may be asked, is the Bar silent with this complete
understanding among them of the incompetency of some of the judges?
It is not a secret-this incompetency. It is useless to pretend, to deny,
to ignore. Almost every lawyer acknowledges it and deplores it.
Then why not cry out? The answer is simple. The practicing lawyer
will not only injure himself in his future practice, but, more important
still, on his next appearance in court, might injure some innocent
client to whom he owes the utmost fidelity. It is given to but few
lawyers to be in the position of the writer who has virtually retired
from the court practice of his profession."
As to the remedy, the Judge submits: "It is vain to exploit and
condemn the system without suggesting some remedy. The following
have been suggested: i. Appointment instead of election. Judging
from the experiences of the appointments in this department by gov-

